A Study on the Impacts of Oil prices on the Mauritian Economy

By Karim Jaufeerally

 

On several occasions we have discussed the phenomenon of Peak Oil which happens when world oil production reaches its maximum (as it must given it is a finite and non renewable resource) and then subsequently declines till extinction of this human activity into the far future. The critical phase is when this annual production begins its decline AND NOT when ALL oil wells are dry. When oil production peaks, the resource base is still very large but not large enough to sustain current production. Peak oil is a matter of annual or daily flow rates and not only a matter of the remaining resource base.

Furthermore, oil being a complex natural resource, different types of oil have different resource base and each type of oil will peak at different periods in time at different levels of production. Nevertheless, all types of oils put together, a period will be reached when the aggregate resource base of all types of oils is insufficient to maintain current flow rates and thus a decline in rates of production will happen.

It is vital to understand that Peak Oil is not a matter of whether it will happen one day but rather of when it will occur. Given the essential nature of oil for transportation, after all 95% of all mechanised transportation system worldwide relies on oil and 60% of oil goes to transportation, any shortfall in the availability of oil will have drastic economic and social repercussions. Substitutes for oil in transportation are both inadequate in terms of quality and quantity. Furthermore, substitutes take time to be deployed worldwide, hence the importance of the phenomenon. Yet before oil production peaks, it stands to reason that oil prices will not stay low but might increase dramatically followed by price crashes. In short, close to peak, volatility of oil prices will increase manifold.

Since 2004, we have seen dramatic increases and considerable volatility in oil prices. Indeed, prices have gone from below US $ 30 per barrel to US $ 147 in 2008 followed by a crash and subsequent rapid rises to such an extent that oil prices have flirted regularly with the US $ 125 per barrel level during the 1st quarter of 2012 whilst in the 2nd quarter prices have fallen considerably to the low eighties.

In the meanwhile oil production has stagnated from 2005 till 2010 with a small increase of 1.3% in 2011 (BP statistical review of world energy June 2012). Now we are not saying that increased oil prices and volatility are due to Peak Oil, although evidence is slowly accumulating that it is playing a role. Nevertheless, high oil prices and increased volatility are real and undeniable and given the importance of oil in our modern society it is of some use to assess impacts of oil prices on a modern economy.  

Although no-one knows how oil prices will behave in the future, we can nevertheless attempt to model the impacts of different levels of oil prices on the Mauritian economy. This paper is such an attempt. An earlier version of this paper was published in 2005 and 2007. We believe that it is time to have an updated version given that from 2005 onwards oil prices have been very high thus offering an added insight into the overall behaviour of the Mauritian economy.

Karim Jaufeerally

 

An Elementary Model to Assess the Impact of Different Levels of Oil Prices on the Mauritian Economy

 

Abstract

An elementary model is proposed to assess the impact on the Mauritian economy of different levels of oil prices. It uses data readily available from National Accounts published by Statistics Mauritius (the organisation responsible for collecting data on Mauritius), from annual reports of the Bank of Mauritius and from BP’s annual energy statistical review. The data used are Imports of Mineral Fuels and Lubricants (IMFL), Export of Goods and Services (EGS), Gross Domestic Product at market prices (GDPmp), Gross National Savings (GNS), Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (GDFCF), Final Consumption Expenditure (FCE) and Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI). Various ratios are computed from 1976 to 2011 and displayed graphically. It is found that these ratios exhibit interesting trends over the years. They are also correlated with each other to a high degree.

Using those ratios, it is possible to map out the impact of oil prices on savings, consumption and GNDI growth in Mauritius. Hence, one can infer what levels oil prices may begin to have deleterious effects on the Mauritian Economy. It is very important to understand that we do not attempt to predict the evolution of oil prices on the short, medium or long term. We only attempt to assess the impacts of different levels of oil prices on the Mauritian economy. The main findings are that as oil prices increase a larger proportion of our export revenue goes into paying for mineral fuels, whilst savings expressed as a percentage of GNS over GDP(mp) drop and FCE takes a larger share of GNDI and investment expressed as GDFCF over GDP drops with a two year delay. It is also found that rates of increase in real GNDI declines with increases in oil prices.

Thus according to the model, once 30% or more of EGS goes into paying for IMFL, GNS and GDFCF drop to very low levels and rates of growth of GNDI gets close to zero. An economy with very low levels of savings and investment and low growth rate is set for trouble.

According to our model, for 2012, based on a level of EGS of Rs 188 billion, an exchange rate of Rs 29.90 for the US dollar and an average yearly price of US$ 106 per barrel of oil (Bbls), we estimate that IMFL will be of the order of Rs 31 billion, thus 16.5% of our EGS would go for IMFL. Our savings rate would be 15.85% of GDP(mp) and investments would be 25% of GDP(fc) whilst FCE would reach 84% of GNDI. Growth rates in GNDI would be around 3%. 

At US$ 126 per Bbls, 19.63% of EGS goes to pay for IMFL, the savings rate drops to 12%, investments to 23% whilst FCE/GNDI rises to 87%, GNDI grows by only 2%.  Beyond this point the Mauritian economy enters a “Terra Incognita” as any further increases of oil prices pushes the economy in a situation where it never has been before. At US $ 200 per barrel of oil, savings rate drop to zero and FCE reaches close 100% of GNDI whilst growth rates turn negative.

Based on our model we thus can say that for the projected levels of EGS for 2012, the Mauritian economy can sustain oil prices of US $ 126 per Bbls without too much difficulty, except for resultant low savings rates and low growth rates in GNDI. However, as oil prices get higher (above US$ 126 per Bbls) the savings and growth rates decline steadily to very low levels. 

 

Introduction

The Mauritian economy is very much export orientated due to the fact that there are few natural resources and the internal market is small (estimated population: 1,286,000, Statistics Mauritius, 2011). The main exports are sugar and textiles to the EU and the US. Tourism is a major provider of foreign exchange with Western Europe the main provider of tourists. Financial services, with the Freeport and offshore sectors, are important foreign exchange providers. Information technology sectors are beginning to provide much needed foreign exchange and employment. Like any modern country, Mauritius relies on cheap and abundant oil to make its economy run and above all, grow. The desired economic growth is very much predicated on an increased supply of cheap oil. However, since 2004, oil prices have regularly risen, breaching US $ 40 per Bbls in May 2004, reaching US $ 147 in August 2008, collapsing to US 30 late 2008 and steadily increasing to reach an average for 2012 (from January to June) of US $ 106.

Surprisingly this sharp increase in oil prices have had little visible effects on the economy to date and no-one seems to know how high oil prices can climb before impacts are noticeable. This state of affairs is not acceptable given the essential nature of oil and energy in any economy. This paper is a modest attempt to gain a better understanding of the impacts of oil prices on the Mauritian economy.  

 

Methods and Results

The data used for this paper come from Statistics Mauritius, the Bank of Mauritius and from BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012. The Bank of Mauritius is the Central Bank of the country. It has published financial data in its annual reports on Mauritius from 1966 onwards, the year of its creation. These two organizations are invaluable sources of accurate and up to date information on Mauritius. BP, as a leading global petroleum company, needs no presenting.  

Ratio IMFL/ EGS : Imports of Mineral Fuels and Lubricants as a percentage of Exports of Goods and Services  

The first piece of data used is the yearly Importations of Mineral Fuels and Lubricants (IMFL) in Rupees. It is available since 1963 onwards. As the name implies, this figure covers the importation of mineral fuels and lubricants which are virtually all oil based like diesel, gasoline, kerosene, LPG, aviation fuels (for 2011, over 90% of IMFL was for petroleum based products). The country does not import natural gas (methane), and until 1998 did not import much coal. Since then the country imports significant quantities of coal for electrical power generation.

It is important to note that, except for bicycles, all internal and external transportation rely exclusively on oil. With economic and population growth, IMFL has gone from Rs 14.2 million in 1963 to reach Rs 31,940 million in 2011. The second statistic used is that of Exports of Goods and Services (EGS) from 1966 till 2011. It includes the value of all goods exports (mainly sugar and textiles) and services like tourism earnings and financial services.

In 1966, EGS was Rs 403 million and in 2011 it reached Rs 174,962 million. It is therefore interesting to see how the ratio of IMFL/EGS has varied over the years. This ratio in fact measures the percentage of our foreign earnings that must be devoted to the imports of mineral fuels. Undoubtedly, it is a very important ratio.

Figure 1 below shows how this ratio (henceforth called IMFL/EGS) has moved from 1966 to 2011. We observe that in 1966 it was a very low 3.82%. It goes up and down a little till 1973. As from 1974, when oil prices reached US$11 Bbls, it steadily increases and in 1977, it crosses the 10% mark. By 1979, date of the Iranian Revolution, it crosses the 15% mark. In 1981 it reaches the historic maximum of 19.69 %. From 1982 to 1985, the ratio steadily drops but remains above 10% throughout. In that period, oil prices began to drop from US$ 31 to US$ 27 Bbls. The ratio also dropped because EGS increased from Rs 5572 million to Rs 8925 million at the same time. In 1986, oil prices fell precipitously to US$ 14 and for the next 14 years oil prices remained between US$ 14 and 20, except for a transient peak in 1990 due to the First Gulf War. During The same period EGS increased from Rs 11,995 million in 1986 to Rs 69,099 million in 1999. This explains why throughout this period the ratio IMFL/EGS remained well below 8%. In 2000, oil prices spiked resulting in an increase in the IMFL/EGS ratio to 8.73%.

It dropped to about 7% in 2001 and 2002, however as from 2003 it began an upward climb reaching 8% and crossing the 10% mark in 2004, the first time since 1985. In 2008, with oil prices at US$ 97 per barrel on average, the ratio IMFL/EGS reached 19.53 % and nearly matched the 1981 level which is the highest ever since 1963. In 2009, the ratio drops to 13% but since has steadily crept up and in 2011 it topped 18.26%. We estimate that in 2012, this ratio should be around 16%. 

 

The Saving rate from 1976 to 2011 and its correlation with IMFL/EGS

Statistics Mauritius defines the savings rate as the ratio of GNS to GDP at market prices. GNS is calculated as the difference between GNDI and FCE. GNS figures are available only from 1976 onwards.

From figure 2, we can see the evolution of savings from 1976 onwards. It stands at 25% in 1976 and very quickly begins a sharp descent to reach the lowest ever of 10% in 1980. It begins to rise as from 1981 and by 1986 it had climbed to above 25% remaining so till 2004 when it falls to 23%. In 2009 it drops to 13.92% level, the lowest for years. In 2010 and 2011 it inches back up to barely 15%. We estimate that for 2012, it should be close to 15.8%.

It is clear that the graph of figure 2 is inversely correlated with IMFL/EGS. The scatter graph of IMFL/EGS against GNS/GDP(mp) clearly shows that in figure 3. There is a very high co-efficient of variation (R^2=0.8085). Such a linear relationship between these two variables was not expected.

 

 

Equation of Fig 3: y=-1.647x + 0.3337, R2=0.8085

 

FCE as a percentage of GNDI and its correlation with IMFL/EGS

Figure 4 shows the evolution of FCE/GNDI from 1976 to 2011. We note that as from 1977 it increased and breached the 80% mark. It reached a maximum of 90% in 1980 and thereafter begun to drop and as from 1985 it plunged below 80%. From 1986 to 2004 it remained in a band close to 75%. As from 2004 it shot above the 75% level and climbed to above 85% in 2009. It is obvious that FCE/GNDI is positively correlated with IMFL/EGS. A scatter graph of IMFL/EGS against FCE/GNDI from 1976 to 2011 shows that very clearly (figure 5). The co-efficient of variation is very high (R^2=0.8126).

 

 

Equation of Fig 5: y=1.0240x + 0.6737, R2=0.8126

 

 

The investment rate from 1976 to 2011 and its correlation with IMFL/EGS

The investment rate is measured as the ratio of GDFCF to GDP. From figure 6 we see that the investment rate begun a sharp decline from 32% in 1978 to 21% in 1982. As from 1985 it steadily climbed to reach 34% in 1988. It remained rather high till 1995 when it fell and then oscillated around 30%. However by 2004 it had fallen to 25% and since it has remained below 30%.

Its correlation with IMFL/EGS is much less clear and a scatter graph of IMFL/EGS against GDFCF/GDP reveals a much weaker linkage (figure 7) with a low co-efficient of variation (R^2=0.1918). However, when the GDFCF/GDP time series is shifted back by two years in relation to the IMFL/EGS time series, a much better correlation is obtained, the co-efficient of variation now nearly doubles (R^2=0.3297) as seen in figure 8. It thus appears that there is a two years time delay between high IMFL/EGS and lower investment rates, but the effect is much weaker.

 

 

Equation of Fig 7: y = -0.3714 + 0.3217, R2=0.1918

 

Equation of Fig 8: y = -0.5156x + 0.3344, R2=0.3297

 

 

IMFL/EGS correlated with GDP/IMFL

A new ratio is introduced which is GDP divided by IMFL. Given that all mechanised transport and 70% of electrical generation in Mauritius require mineral fuels, (oil based products and some coal, whilst the balance is from either hydro power or from burning bagasse, the residue of sugar cane processing) it would appear interesting to calculate how much GDP is generated, directly and indirectly for every Rupee spent on importing mineral fuels. In effect, it measures the multiplying effect on GDP of each Rupee of mineral fuels imported. Figure 9 shows how this ratio has evolved from 1964 to 2011. A link with IMFL/EGS is not immediately apparent. However when IMFL/EGS is plotted against GDP/IMFL as in figure 10, it is very surprising to see the data arranging itself in a declining arc. This implies an inverse relationship between the two variables. Indeed, when IMFL/EGS is low, GDP/IMFL is high. When IMFL/EGS goes up, GDP/IMFL decreases sharply. The co-efficient of variation (R^2=0.8971) is very high. As can be seen in figure 10, the equation of best fit is an inverse power relationship. Such a relationship between these two variables was not expected.

 

Equation of Fig 10: y=2.0736x(-0.8889) , R2=0.8971

 

 

Discussion

We have seen that the IMFL/EGS ratio has varied widely since 1966, climbing to very high levels from 1979 to 1984 which corresponds to the second oil shock. This period corresponds exactly to a period of low or non existent economic growth as can be seen in figure 11. As from 1985, oil prices begin to drop significantly, the ratio IMFL/EGS also drops significantly and from thereon Mauritius embarks on a twenty year period of continuous economic growth. We are not claiming direct causality, but common sense dictates that low oil prices had a positive role to play at this point. Most probably it was a necessary condition for economic growth but of course not sufficient on its own.

 

 

We have seen that as IMFL/EGS increased, the savings rate decreased simultaneously and proportionately. Very high co-efficient of variation are not proof of causality, but they do indicate that strong causal links exist between the variables under consideration. Reasonably, as oil prices increase and the IMFL/EGS ratio increases, more foreign exchange funds are devoted to paying for oil products, and so more funds leave the country, leaving less for the importation of other goods making the latter more expensive, thus pushing prices up, the FCE goes up and hence the saving rate drops.

We have also seen that as IMFL/EGS increases, FCE/GNDI increases in step and linearly. This is to be expected given the drop in savings noted earlier because what is not saved is consumed and what is saved is not consumed. It shows the overall consistency of the data we have analysed and of our approach. The investment rate also drops but with a two year delay and at a lesser pace than savings. The same mechanisms could be at work here, less savings means less capital available for investments.

The inverse relationship between IMFL/EGS and GDP/IMFL is the most baffling, yet the same mechanisms are most probably at work. Less foreign funds around due to high oil prices means less economic activity, hence less GDP generated and so the multiplying effect of fuel imports drops.

However, there is another way of manipulating the data that is of great interest to us. This is by noting that when IMFL/EGS ratios were low (below 10%) during the 1976-1978 and the 1985-2005 periods the real growth rates of GNDI were above 5% per year. The converse is true for the 1978-1984 and 2005-2011 periods which coincided with high IMFL/EGS ratios (above 15%) and low growth rates for GNDI. Furthermore we can plot average IMFL/EGS against average increases in real GNDI as shown in figure 12. If we exclude the 1979-1984 period during which increases in GNDI were negative and thus distorts the picture, we see that there is a linear relationship between average IMFL/EGS against average increases in real GNDI. Admittedly, three data points are insufficient from a statistical point of view, but the trend is so clear that the data merits inclusion in this paper. A similar calculation can be done with GDP(mp) in real terms which gives essentially similar trends. It has thus been left out.

 

Average

IMFL/EGS

Average

Inc in GNDI

1976-1978

9.83%

5.37%

1979-1984

16.58%

-0.44%

1985-2005

7.46%

6.39%

2006-2011

16.41%

3.27%

Table 1

 

Equation of Fig 12: y= - 0.3431x + 0.0886, R2=0.9956

 

 

At this point we can suggest that when IMFL/EGS is below 10%, the Mauritian economy will most probably experience real growth in GNDI of above 5.5% per year. When the IMFL/EGS is in between 10% to 15%, GNDI growth rates will be in between 5.5% to 3.75%. Between 15% and 20%, growth rates will be lower still and hover from 3.75% to 2%. Above 20%, growth rates will slide even more and plunge under 2% and above 26% growth rates turn negative.

We are now in a position to describe the impacts of high oil prices on the Mauritian economy. As oil prices increase, the cost of importing mineral fuels and lubricants increases, if the export of goods and services does not increase rapidly enough, the IMFL/EGS ratio increases. It represents an increased outflow of foreign funds for the same level of economic activity. Savings drop as a greater proportion of the national income is devoted to consumption.

This drop in savings means that after a delay of two years (approximately) investments (GDFCF) also begin to drop, albeit at a slower rate. As more foreign funds leaves the country to pay for higher oil costs, there is less money around to generate economic activity; hence for each Rupee of oil imports, less GDP is created. The GDP/IMFL ratio drops. At the same time, real growth rates for GNDI also drops.

Using the different equations we have devised, the impacts of different levels of oil prices on savings, investments, consumption and growth rates in Mauritius can be computed as shown in the table below.

The estimates for 2012 are that EGS will be Rs 188,000 Million. The IMFL/EGS ratio is computed by keeping this value for EGS as constant and varying the value of IMFL in line with estimates of oil consumption, increases or decreases in oil prices and using an average US exchange rate of Rs 29.90.

 

 

Average oil prices over a year (US$ per Barrel)

IMFL

Rs Million

EGS

Rs Million

IMFL/

EGS

GNS/GDP (mp)

Savings Rates

GDFCF/GDP

Investment rates

FCE/

GNDI

GDP/

IMFL

% Inc in GNDI

 

60

17,577

188,000

9.35%

23.42%

28.62%

76.94%

16.88

5.65%

80

23,436

188,000

12.47%

18.44%

27.01%

80.14%

13.09

4.58%

100

29,296

188,000

15.58%

16.78%

25.41%

83.33%

10.74

3.51%

106 (average for 2012)

31,053

188,000

16.52%

15.78%

24.92%

84.28%

10.20

3.19%

126 (entry into Terra Incognita)

36,912

188,000

19.63%

12.47%

23.32%

87.48%

8.76

2.12%

140

41,014

188,000

21.82%

10.14%

22.19%

89.71%

7.98

1.37%

160

46,873

188,000

24.93%

6.82%

20.58%

92.90%

7.09

0.31%

200

58,592

188,000

31.17%

0.19%

17.37%

99.28%

5.82

-1.83%

Table 2

From table 2 it is seen that with oil prices below US$ 60, IMFL/EGS will be below 10%. Savings rate will be a healthy 23%, investment 28%, FCE only 77% of GNDI, the multiplying effect of fuel imports a healthy factor 16 and a growth rate of GNDI of above 5%. It is the business as usual scenario.

At a price of US$ 126 per barrel or above on average over a given year, Mauritius will be entering unknown territory and it will usher in a new era given that Mauritius has never been in a situation when 20% or more of its EGS goes into paying for IMFL. From the model, it is clear that savings will be low, 12.5%, investment will fall and FCE will rise to 87% of GNDI with sluggish growth rates of 2%. Mauritius will be in Terra Incognita. As from US$ 200, savings drop to zero, investment is now very low and nearly all of our GNDI goes into FCE and growth rates turn negative. Always bear in mind that these thresholds in US $ are dependent on current estimates for IMFL, EGS and US $ exchange rates. It follows that every year the thresholds must be recalculated accordingly.

 

 

Conclusion

A simple, yet coherent model has been proposed to model the impacts of different levels of oil prices on the Mauritian economy. As at July 2012, the average price of oil hovered at US$ 106. We are still within the safe margin but fairly close to the threshold of US $ 126 per barrel. By how much can oil prices move up to or down to is basically an unanswerable question given that many factors contribute to this dynamic. However, we now know that it is detrimental to the Mauritian economy to let the IMFL/EGS ratio climb to very high levels. Ideally it should be kept below 10% for high growth, but this will be very difficult given the uncertainties that surround the world economy and the future evolution of oil prices. A 15% target is more achievable especially if we begin at once a serious transition away from oil products. However, we must always remember that 74% of petroleum products consumed in Mauritius are for air, maritime and land transport purposes. We thus must seriously begin to think how to reduce our needs for oil in transportation. Alas, substitutes for oil in transportation are inadequate both in terms of quantity and quality making any transition away from oil very problematic. Yet this transition is of vital importance to the welfare of the people of this country.

References:

  1. National Accounts of Mauritius, various issues from 1966 to 2011
  2. BP Annual Energy Statistical Review of 2012
  3. Bank of Mauritius Annual Reports, various issues from 1966 to 2011

 

Glossary of Terms Used

EGS: Export of Goods and non-factor services

Exports and imports of goods are compiled according to the General Trade System, using the national boundary as the statistical frontier. All goods entering the country are recorded in imports and goods leaving the country, in exports.

FCE: Final Consumption Expenditure

Consumption expenditure is made up of final consumption expenditure of households and Government.

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

The sum of value added of all domestic producers gives the GDP

GDFCF: Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation

GDFCF consists of the net additions to the assets of producers of tangible reproducible goods which have an expected lifetime of use of more than one year

GNS: Gross National Savings

Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) less total final consumption expenditure gives GNS

GNDI: Gross National Disposable Income

The sum of Gross National Income (GNI) and net transfers from the rest of the world gives GNDI

GNI: Gross National Income

GDP plus net primary income from abroad gives GNI

IMFL: Imports of Mineral Fuels and Lubricants

The Rupee value of all imports of petroleum products and lubricants and coal

 

 

 

Data used

 

 

Rs Mn Imports of Mineral Fuels and Lubricants IMFL

 

 

Exports of Goods and services EGS

 

Yearly Inflation Rate

 

 

GDP at

Market

Prices

RS  Million

 

Gross National Disposable Income GNDI

1963

14.20

 

 

 

 

1964

17.00

 

 

 

 

1965

17.70

 

 

 

 

1966

15.40

403

 

 

 

1967

25.40

388

 

 

 

1968

35.90

464

7.3

982

 

1969

31.70

489

2.3

1,053

 

1970

29.70

548

1.5

1,192

 

1971

29.70

542

0.3

1,306

 

1972

50.70

775

5.4

1,576

 

1973

63.60

1,018

13.5

2,014

 

1974

161.50

2,154

29.1

3,470

 

1975

194.60

2,329

14.8

3,806

 

1976

209.00

2,388

13.4

4,704

4,785

1977

275.30

2,656

9.2

5,442

5,509

1978

280.70

2,705

8.5

6,258

6,295

1979

526.20

3,260

14.5

7,640

7,612

1980

667.30

4,450

42

8,697

8,678

1981

899.00

4,566

14.5

10,209

9,948

1982

937.00

5,529

11.4

11,725

11,448

1983

972.00

5,953

5.6

12,763

12,488

1984

1,076.00

6,989

7.3

14,360

14,035

1985

1,153.00

8,895

6.7

16,618

16,272

1986

706.00

11,919

1.8

19,700

19,390

1987

978.00

15,639

0.6

24,222

24,223

1988

1,009.00

18,565

9.2

28,683

29,093

1989

1,509.00

21,363

12.6

32,274

34,064

1990

1,939.00

25,619

13.5

39,275

40,184

1991

2,053.00

27,861

7

44,316

45,723

1992

1,945.00

29,759

4.6

49,739

51,327

1993

2,109.00

33,543

10.5

56,689

58,544

1994

2,133.00

36,249

7.3

63,519

64,930

1995

2,401.00

41,205

6

69,988

71,419

1996

3,211.00

50,465

6.6

78,360

79,650

1997

3,471.00

54,194

6.6

87,242

89,552

1998

3,145.00

65,711

6.8

99,564

100,781

1999

4,046.00

69,099

6.90

107,749

110,899

2000

6,450.00

73,841

4.20

119,085

119,964

2001

6,504.00

90,463

5.40

132,218

134,575

2002

6,634.00

88,301

6.40

142,484

145,619

2003

7,290.00

88,714

3.90

157,383

158,021

2004

10,020.00

94,859

4.70

175,810

176,794

2005

15,394.00

110,940

4.90

185,348

186,906

2006

19,321.00

127,128

8.90

206,328

210,230

2007

22,180.00

141,187

8.80

243,998

253,459

2008

28,352.00

145,204

9.70

274,316

282,798

2009

18,557.00

138,243

2.50

282,354

287,930

2010

25,630.00

156,939

2.90

298,784

308,070

2011

31,940.00

174,962

6.50

323,459

329,670

 

 

Gross National

Oil Prices

US Exg

Gross Domestic Fixed Capital

Final consumption

 

savings

US $ per

Rate

Formation

expenditure

 

GNS

Bbl

Rs/US$

GDFCF

FCE

1963

 

1.80

 

 

 

1964

 

1.80

 

177

 

1965

 

1.80

 

155

 

1966

 

1.80

 

133

 

1967

 

1.80

 

145

 

1968

 

1.80

5.63

141

 

1969

 

1.80

5.60

 

 

1970

 

1.80

5.61

 

 

1971

 

2.24

5.26

 

 

1972

 

2.48

5.75

 

 

1973

 

3.29

5.82

 

 

1974

 

11.58

5.74

 

 

1975

 

11.53

6.66

 

 

1976

1,206

12.38

6.73

1,287

3,579

1977

1,118

13.30

6.45

1,510

4,391

1978

1,188

13.60

5.98

1,770

5,107

1979

1,459

30.03

7.66

1,965

6,153

1980

892

35.69

7.91

2,028

7,786

1981

1,249

34.28

10.44

2,240

8,699

1982

1,523

31.76

10.97

2,100

9,925

1983

1,908

28.77

11.91

2,300

10,580

1984

2,359

28.78

13.95

2,595

11,676

1985

3,239

27.56

15.58

3,100

13,033

1986

5,314

14.43

13.27

3,890

14,076

1987

6,698

18.44

13.01

5,175

17,525

1988

7,884

14.92

13.59

8,090

21,209

1989

8,706

18.23

15.41

8,680

25,358

1990

10,197

23.73

14.89

12,030

29,987

1991

12,448

20.00

15.71

12,680

33,275

1992

14,633

19.32

15.58

13,810

36,694

1993

15,807

16.97

17.70

16,065

42,737

1994

16,331

15.82

18.08

19,350

48,600

1995

17,871

17.02

17.80

16,750

53,548

1996

19,859

20.67

19.71

20,125

59,790

1997

23,026

19.09

21.05

23,430

66,526

1998

25,225

12.72

23.98

23,075

75,556

1999

27,995

17.97

25.15

29,676

82,904

2000

30,479

28.50

26.26

28,069

89,485

2001

37,607

24.44

29.07

29,798

96,968

2002

39,028

25.02

29.96

31,075

106,591

2003

39,596

28.83

28.38

35,554

118,425

2004

39,701

38.27

27.75

38,003

136,862

2005

32,189

54.52

29.74

39,731

154,717

2006

35,384

65.14

31.95

50,048

174,846

2007

52,445

72.39

31.55

61,240

201,014

2008

47,249

97.26

29.02

67,529

235,549

2009

39,299

61.67

32.57

74,430

248,630

2010

46,140

79.50

31.50

74,395

261,930

2011

49,075

111.26

29.30

76,692

280,595